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BRIEF OVERVIEW OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS,
CONGRESSIONAL ACTION, AND UNRESOLVED ISSUES

In the wake of George Floyd’s murder on May 25th, 2020,
thousands took to the streets across each of the fifty states to protest
racism and the use of force by police. 1 Mark Pettibone was thrust into
the national spotlight when, while walking home from a protest,
unknown federal officers threw him into an unmarked van. 2 Inside
the van, the officers held Pettibone’s hands over his head and covered
his face. 3 They took Pettibone to the nearby federal courthouse,
where he was photographed, searched, detained, and ultimately
released ninety minutes later. 4 The officers never identified
themselves. 5 In addition to Pettibone’s abduction, videos surfaced
showing heavily armed—and unidentified—individuals forcibly
detaining protesters. 6 An official from the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) later stated that federal agents used unmarked
vehicles for the officers’ safety. 7
*

1.

2.

3.
4.
5.
6.

7.

J.D. Candidate, 2023, University of Baltimore School of Law; B.A., English, May
2014, University of Maryland, Baltimore County; B.A., Ancient Studies, May 2014,
University of Maryland, Baltimore County. I would like to thank Professor Kimberly
Wehle for her support and guidance throughout the writing process. I also offer my
sincerest thanks to my colleagues and friends on University of Baltimore Law Review
for their dedication to ensuring an excellent final product. Finally, a special thank you
to my wonderful husband for his tireless support during my studies.
Janie Haseman et al., Tracking Protests Across the USA in the Wake of George
Floyd’s Death, USA TODAY, https://www.usatoday.com/in-depth/graphics/2020/06/
03/map-protests-wakegeorge-floyds-death/5310149002/
[https://perma.cc/NT2ZXVJ4] (June 18, 2020, 6:48 PM).
Jonathan Levinson & Conrad Wilson, Federal Law Enforcement Use Unmarked
Vehicles to Grab Protesters off Portland Streets, OPB, https://www.opb.org/
news/article/federal-law-enforcement-unmarked-vehicles-portland-protesters/
[https://perma.cc/MTJ6-QATA] (July 16, 2020, 7:46 PM); Alex Ward, The Unmarked
Federal Agents Arresting People in Portland, Explained, VOX (July 20, 2020, 6:30
PM), https://www.vox.com/2020/7/20/21328387/portland-protests-unmarked-arresttrump-wold [https://perma.cc/8JXW-LHTR].
Levinson & Wilson, supra note 2.
Id.
Id.
Eleven Films (@Eleven_Films), TWITTER (Jul. 16, 2020, 11:32 PM),
https://twitter.com/Eleven_Films/status/1283967750981873670
[https://perma.cc/TAX2-7M38]; Eliott C. McLaughlin, Portland Protests Remain
Largely Peaceful Until Night Falls and Police are Targeted, Authorities Say, CNN,
https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/27/us/portland-protests-proud-boys-antifablm/index.html [https://perma.cc/6Z4H-4E9V] (Sept. 28, 2020, 3:02 PM).
Jonathan Levinson et. al., Federal Officers Use Unmarked Vehicles to Grab People in
Portland, DHS Confirms, NPR (July 17, 2020, 1:04 PM), https://www.npr.org/

2022]

The Case for Requiring Identifying Insignia

277

The presence of unidentified federal troops was not limited to
isolated incidents. 8 Federal agents in Washington, D.C. were openly
hostile when asked by reporters to identify the agency they worked
for. 9 In early June 2020, Department of Justice officials held a press
conference to discuss the administration’s response to George
Floyd’s death. 10 When asked whether federal law enforcement
agencies had been instructed not to identify themselves, one official
stated he was unaware of any such instructions 11: “I probably should
have done a better job of marking them nationally as [an] agency.”12
Attorney General William Barr explained that federal agents are not
legally required to wear identifying insignias that display officer
names. 13 Later that day, Nancy Pelosi sent a letter to President Trump
expressing concern about the “increased militarization” and presence
of unidentified law enforcement officers. 14

8.

9.
10.

11.
12.
13.

2020/07/17/892277592/federal-officers-use-unmarked-vehicles-to-grab-protesters-inportland [https://perma.cc/D5YE-S9CV]; McLaughlin, supra note 6; see also
discussion infra Part IV.B.
Matt Ford, America Has a Secret Police Problem, THE NEW REPUBLIC (June 27,
2020),
https://newrepublic.com/article/158322/america-secret-police-problem
[https://perma.cc/Q5FT-MU28]; Steve Almasy, Some Law Enforcement Officers at
Protests Have No Badges and Some Have Covered Them. City Officials Say that is
Unacceptable, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2020/06/05/politics/law-enforcementbadges-protests/index.html [https://perma.cc/VM26-9HPN] (June 5, 2020, 10:38 PM);
see Eleven Films, supra note 6.
Ford, supra note 8; Almasy, supra note 8.
William Barr & Chris Wray, Dep’t of Just., Remarks on George Floyd’s Death and
Civil Unrest (June 4, 2020), transcribed at https://www.rev.com/blog/transcripts/
william-barr-chris-wray-doj-press-conference-transcript-on-george-floyd-death
[https://perma.cc/5BTU-8FKD].
Id.
Id. (referring to Bureau of Prisons personnel).
Id. At the press conference, Barr stated,
Now, in the federal system, we don’t wear badges with our name.
I mean, the agents don’t wear badges and their names . . . which
many civilian police agents, I mean, non-federal police agencies,
do. And I could understand why some of these individuals simply
wouldn’t want to talk to people about who they are . . . .

14.

Id.
Press Release, Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, House of Representatives, Pelosi Sends Letter
to President Trump on Deployment of Troops & Unidentified Law Enforcement
Personnel in Nation’s Capital (June 4, 2020), https://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/
6420-0 [https://perma.cc/HC2B-CWEC].
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The lack of transparency regarding the unidentified agents sparked
criticism. 15 Their presence raised questions about distinguishing
between state-sanctioned actors and private vigilantes. 16 Similar
concerns were raised about state interference with those exercising
their First Amendment rights. 17 Congress took these concerns
seriously 18 by adding an amendment to the National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) that required federal law enforcement to
wear identifying insignias when policing civil disturbances. 19 The
NDAA passed on New Year’s Day 2021 over a veto by President
Trump. 20
The legislation requires that whenever members of the armed
forces, National Guard, or other federal law enforcement personnel
“provide support to Federal authorities to respond to a civil
disturbance,” they must “visibly display” the identity of the
individual and the name of the federal agency they serve. 21 There is
an exception for undercover agents. 22 The badge requirement only
applies when agents “respond to a civil disturbance.” 23 The statute
15.

16.

17.
18.

19.

20.

21.
22.
23.

E.g., Kimberly Wehle, Anonymous Police Threaten People’s Freedom to Assemble,
THE HILL (June 12, 2020, 10:30 AM), https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/502419anonymous-police-threatens-peoples-freedom-to-assemble [https://perma.cc/ME73NSWL].
See Andrew Clevenger, Issues Linger After House Armed Services’ Smooth NDAA
Markup, ROLL CALL (July 6, 2020, 6:32 AM), https://www.rollcall.com/2020/07/06/
issues-linger-after-house-armed-services-smooth-ndaa-markup/
[https://perma.cc/7C7C-EBWN].
See, e.g., Wehle, supra note 15.
See Catie Edmondson, House Passes Defense Bill Overwhelmingly, Defying Trump’s
Veto Threat, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/08/us/
politics/house-military-bill-confederate-base-names-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/Q4GG-9TXC].
H.R. REP. NO. 116-457, at 224 (2020); William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 3388,
3860 (to be codified at 10 U.S.C. § 723) [hereinafter NDAA]; see also discussion
infra Part II.
E.g., John Haltiwanger, GOP-Led Senate Delivers First Successful Veto Override of
Trump’s Presidency in Fight Over Defense Bill During His Final Weeks in Office,
BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 1, 2021, 2:35 PM), https://www.businessinsider.com/senategives-trump-first-veto-override-defense-spending-bill-2021-1 [https://perma.cc/65JSZLL9]. Trump’s veto was on grounds unrelated to the inclusion of the language
requiring law enforcement to wear insignias. See Amanda Macias, Trump Vetoes
Colossal $740 Billion Defense Bill, Breaking with Republican-Led Senate, CNBC,
https://www.cnbc.com/2020/12/23/trump-vetoes-740-billion-ndaa-defense-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/36QP-UMRE] (Dec. 24, 2020, 8:35 PM).
NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
Id. § 723(b).
Id. § 723(a); Clevenger supra note 16.
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suggests that the Legislature did not intend an identification
requirement for federal law enforcement in all circumstances. 24 This
leaves an unanswered—and essential—question: what is a “civil
disturbance?”
On January 6, 2021, days after the legislation passed, a hoard of
rioters stormed the United States Capitol.25 Without badges,
distinguishing between the armed National Guard activated by D.C.
Mayor Bowser and “incognito” members of the Proud Boys and
other armed protestors dressed in militaristic regalia would be
impossible. 26 In response to the horrifying breach of the Capitol, the
National Guard sent over 25,000 troops to D.C. in advance of
President Biden’s inauguration. 27 After the peaceful transition of
power, 7,000 troops remained in D.C. through the end of the
month. 28 The January 6th insurrection 29 was undoubtedly a civil
24.
25.
26.

27.

28.

29.

See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
Dan Barry & Sheera Frenkel, ‘Be There. Will be Wild!’: Trump All but Circled the
Date, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/06/us/politics/capitol-mobtrump-supporters.html [https://perma.cc/EHB3-Y284] (July 27, 2021).
D.C. National Guard to Activate Hundreds of Troops for Pro-Trump Demonstration,
CBS (Jan. 4, 2021, 12:36
PM),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/dc-nationalguard-activating-hundreds-of-troops-for-pro-trump-demonstration/
[https://perma.cc/28LP-HZS2]; Kaelan Deese, Proud Boys to Attend Jan 6. DC
HILL
(Jan.
2,
2021,
11:12
AM),
Rallies
‘Incognito’,
THE
https://thehill.com/homenews/news/532362-proud-boys-to-attend-jan-6-dc-ralliesincognito [https://perma.cc/KB27-NTUR]; see also Michael Biesecker et al., Records
Show Fervent Trump Fans Fueled US Capitol Takeover, AP NEWS (Jan. 10, 2021),
https://apnews.com/article/us-capitol-trump-supporters1806ea8dc15a2c04f2a68acd6b55cace [https://perma.cc/3FR4-SKV2].
Press Release, National Guard, 25K Authorized; 50 States, Three Territories and DC
Supporting Presidential Inauguration (Jan. 15, 2021), https://www.nationalguard.mil/
Resources/Press-Releases/Article/2474123/25k-authorized-50-states-threeterritoriesand-dc-supporting-presidential-inaug/ [https://perma.cc/C83H-MXKP]; see also
Matthew S. Schwartz, Up to 25,000 Troops Descend on Washington for Biden’s
Inauguration, NPR (Jan. 16, 2021, 2:46 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
insurrection-at-the-capitol/2021/01/16/957642610/unprecedented-number-oftroopsdescend-on-washington-d-c-for-bidens-inauguration [https://perma.cc/5ANH-KU9L]
(“[The] swearing-in of President-elect Joe Biden will see the biggest security presence
of any inauguration in U.S. history.”).
Howard Altman, 26,000 National Guard Troops Came to DC and Protected the
Inauguration Without Incident. Now the Drawdown Begins, MILITARYTIMES (Jan.
21, 2021), https://www.militarytimes.com/news/your-military/2021/01/21/26000national-guard-troops-came-to-dc-to-protect-the-inauguration-now-the-drawdownbegins/ [https://perma.cc/4DTP-SGMN].
In this comment, I take no position on whether the events of January 6, 2021
constituted an insurrection for legal purposes, only that the events constituted a civil
disturbance. By some definitions, the events of January 6 appear to meet the
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disturbance; 30 however, would the presence of the National Guard at
the inauguration or their continued presence to keep the peace
constitute a “respon[se] to a civil disturbance,” thus triggering the
badge requirements? 31 The law is uncertain.
The country desperately needs this legislation. 32 A lack of
identification, coupled with incidents of police action against the
press 33 and ordinary citizens, 34 as well as the events of January 6th,

30.
31.
32.

33.

34.

requirements constituting an insurrection, while other definitions require some level
of organization as opposed to mob violence. Compare Insurrection, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY
(2d
ed.
1989),
https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/97285
[https://perma.cc/5V8U-W5GX ] (last visited Mar. 7, 2022) (“The action of rising in
arms or open resistance against established authority or governmental restraint.”),
with Insurrection, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (quoting 77 C.J.S. Riot;
Insurrection § 29, at 579 (1994)) (“Insurrection is distinguished from . . . mob
violence by the fact that in insurrection there is an organized and armed uprising
against authority or operations of government, while crimes growing out of mob
violence, however serious . . . are simply unlawful acts in disturbance of the peace
which do not threaten the stability of the government . . . .”). It may be that the events
of January 6 satisfy both definitions. At the time of publication, the House
investigation is ongoing. See, e.g., Press Release, Thompson & Cheney Statement on
Bannon Indictment, Select Committee to Investigate the January 6th Attack on the
United States Capitol (Nov. 12, 2021), https://january6th.house.gov/news/pressreleases/thompson-cheney-statement-bannon-indictment-0 [https://perma.cc/3JXY8E8A] (“Steve Bannon’s indictment should send a clear message to anyone who
thinks they can ignore the Select Committee or try to stonewall our investigation: no
one is above the law.”); see also Jill Lepore, What Should We Call the Sixth of
January?, THE NEW YORKER (Jan. 8, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/what-should-we-call-the-sixth-of-january
[https://perma.cc/6RSY-38SE]
(describing the “vexed racial history” of the term “insurrection”).
See infra Part III (discussing civil disturbance).
Altman, supra note 28; NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
See Kimberly Wehle & Joshua Gehret, Unnamed Law Enforcement Banned Under the
New NDAA, THE HILL (Jan. 5, 2021, 1:30 PM), https://thehill.com/opinion/nationalsecurity/532676-unnamed-law-enforcement-banned-under-the-new-ndaa
[https://perma.cc/43ZE-HKEB].
Marc Tracy & Rachel Abrams, Police Target Journalists as Trump Blames
‘Lamestream Media’ for Protests, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/
01/business/media/reporters-protests-george-floyd.html
[https://perma.cc/4Y29CCUX] (Mar. 10, 2021).
See, e.g., Eric Umansky, My Family Saw a Police Car Hit a Kid on Halloween. Then I
Learned How NYPD Impunity Works., PROPUBLICA (June 23, 2020, 5:00 AM),
https://www.propublica.org/article/my-family-saw-a-police-car-hit-a-kid-onhalloween-then-i-learned-how-nypd-impunity-works [https://perma.cc/FP8P-YPK2];
Phil Helsel, Man, 75, Shoved to Ground by Buffalo Police During Protest is Released
(July
1,
2020,
2:56
AM),
from
Hospital,
NBC
NEWS
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/man-75-shoved-ground-buffalo-policeduring-protest-releasedhospital-n1232630 [https://perma.cc/Q8V9-9RNJ].
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damaged trust between the police and the public. 35 However,
Congress must go further. 36 The law requiring federal law
enforcement to wear identification only applies when officers are
sent in “respon[se] to a civil disturbance.” 37 Why should the
requirement be limited, allowing federal law enforcement to go
unidentified as long as there is no disturbance? 38 Pettibone was not
involved in or around a civil disturbance when he was taken, he was
on his way home. 39 Would the new law protect him? 40 Would it
apply to the extended presence of the National Guard troops in D.C.
after the insurrection? 41 It is far from certain that a court would
interpret the language in a way that would provide broader
protection. 42 Because the state of the law is unclear, it is Congress’s
responsibility to expand the law and require federal officers to wear
identification any time they perform their duties in public. 43
This Comment will make the case for strengthening the law to
apply to federal law enforcement whenever they publicly perform
policing tasks. First, in Part II, this Comment will examine the
legislative history of the applicable language in the NDAA. 44 Next,
Part III will explore how courts have construed “civil disturbance”
and argue for a broader interpretation of the language. 45 Part IV will
address the federal power to command and deputize law enforcement
officers, and some of the vulnerabilities law enforcement may have
under the badge requirement. 46 This Comment will then explore how
constitutional protections will be furthered through strengthening the
35.

36.
37.
38.

39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Aimee Ortiz, Confidence in Police Is at a Record Low, Gallup Survey Finds, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/12/us/gallup-pollpolice.html [https://perma.cc/B2QL-7NBY] (“[W]hat Dr. Goff found most
noteworthy is that now a majority does not have confidence in law enforcement.
That’s ‘unprecedented in this country,’ he said, and it creates a problem for public
safety because compliance with the law ‘begins with trust in it, and not fear of it.’”).
See discussion infra Part II, III.
NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
See Barr & Wray, supra note 10. Comments made by Michael Carjaval suggest it is
normal for federal officers not to wear identification. Id. This could raise problems in
other situations, as documented instances of police abuse do not always occur at civil
disturbances. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 8.
Levinson & Wilson, supra note 2.
See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a); infra Part III.
See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a); Altman, supra note 28; infra Part III.
See infra text accompanying notes 93–101.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
See infra Part IV.
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legislation in Part V. 47 The approach of the states and of international
organizations will be examined in Part VI. 48 Finally, this Comment
will conclude with the approach the Justice Department took towards
policing issues in Ferguson, Missouri and the implications that
approach has for identification. 49
II. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY—THE INSURRECTION ACT
AND CONGRESSIONAL INTENT
While the general events leading to the identification requirement
have been addressed, 50 a more thorough examination of the
legislative history of the NDAA is instructive. 51 This is best done by
exploring the bipartisan nature of the legislation and the
considerations made for both law enforcement and the public. 52 The
history of the NDAA further clarifies why Congress needs to take
additional action. 53
Prior to Representative Chrissy Houlahan’s amendment to the
NDAA, legislators introduced bills to both the House and the Senate
that would require federal law enforcement to display
identification. 54 The stated purposes of the legislation was to promote
accountability of law enforcement, protect the rights of protestors,
and help the public distinguish law enforcement officers from
vigilantes. 55 Both bills were scrapped when Houlahan, a
Pennsylvania Democrat, proposed an amendment to the defense
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

53.
54.
55.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
See infra Part VII.
See supra Part I.
See infra text accompanying notes 54–70.
See 116 CONG. REC. H3508-09 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statements of Reps.
Houlahan & Mitchell); H.R. REP. NO. 116-457, at 224 (2020); Spencer Ackerman,
Incognito Cops Roamed the Streets Amid Summer Protests. The Defense Bill Will Put
BEAST
(Dec.
8,
2020,
6:36
PM),
a
Stop
to
it.,
DAILY
https://www.thedailybeast.com/incognito-cops-roamed-the-streets-amid-summerprotests-the-defense-bill-will-put-a-stop-to-it [https://perma.cc/D8GS-JHC9].
See infra text accompanying notes 66–70; see also infra Part III.
Law Enforcement Identification Act, H.R. 7153, 116th Cong. (2020); Law
Enforcement Identification Act, S. 3909, 116th Cong. (2020).
Press Release, Jamie Raskin, Top Democrats Introduce Law Enforcement
Identification Act (June 11, 2020), https://raskin.house.gov/media/press-releases/topdemocrats-introduce-law-enforcement-identification-act
[https://perma.cc/XU37UWE2]; Press Release, Chris Murphy & Chuck Schumer, Murphy, Schumer to
Trump: Require All Federal Officers Engaged in Policing Peaceful
Protests
to
Identify Themselves (June 8, 2020), https://www.murphy.senate.gov/newsroom/pressreleases/murphy-schumer-to-trump-require-all-federal-officers-engaged-in-policingpeaceful-protests-to-identify-themselves [https://perma.cc/3VS8-RYHJ].
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bill. 56 Houlahan was similarly motivated by the risk of vigilante law
enforcement, stating she had seen footage of civilians in “ambiguous
clothing” that suggested affiliation with the military, which “puts
everyone at risk.” 57
Houlahan initially proposed amending the Insurrection Act instead
of the eventual solution, which added to the special appointments
chapter. 58 The initial amendment did not include the civil disturbance
specification; however, because it amended the Insurrection Act, the
law targeted instances of protest as opposed to general, broader
policing practices. 59 The Insurrection Act specifically applies to
“unlawful obstructions . . . or rebellion.” 60 Houlahan intended the law
to be narrow. 61 Representative Paul Mitchell’s (R-MI) concerns
about overbreadth prompted lawmakers to change the original
language. 62 They added an exception for undercover officers. 63 The
current language includes members of the armed forces, National
Guard, or federal law enforcement personnel who are dispatched to
support local authorities. 64 Compliance with the identification
requirement is limited to “[f]ederal authorities . . . respond[ing] to . . .
civil disturbance[s] . . . .” 65
It seems clear that Congress intended the identification requirement
to apply only to instances of civil disturbance or “domestic
violence.” 66 Both the original amendment to the Insurrection Act and
the final language limit the application to specific instances where the
police are responding to potentially volatile public assemblies. 67
While the adopted language does more to protect demonstrators,
there is uncertainty about how far the requirements of identification
extend, and how the interpretation of the law could develop as a
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

H.R. REP. NO. 116-457, at 224; Clevenger, supra note 16.
Clevenger, supra note 16.
Compare 116 CONG. REC. H3508, (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (amending the
Insurrection Act, 10 U.S.C. § 253), with NDAA, supra note 19 (amending 10 U.S.C.
§ 723).
H.R. REP. NO. 116-457, at 224; see 10 U.S.C. § 252.
10 U.S.C. § 252.
116 CONG. REC. H3508 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statement of Rep. Houlahan) (“This
amendment, my amendment, is very narrow in scope.”).
Clevenger, supra note 16; see 116 CONG. REC. H3509 (daily ed. July 20, 2020)
(statement of Rep. Mitchell).
NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(b).
Id. § 723(a); Ackerman, supra note 52.
NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
116 CONG. REC. H3508 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statement of Rep. Houlahan)
(quoting 10 U.S.C. § 253).
Id.
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result. 68 Courts construing this language and examining the NDAA’s
legislative history may find congressional intent to limit the
application of the language and opt for a narrower interpretation,
potentially leaving citizens outside the law’s protection. 69 A better
interpretation of the “respon[se] to” language is as a reflection of
congressional intent for law enforcement to be generally identified
publicly, especially since Congress passed the language to directly
combat and end unidentified law enforcement agents interacting with
the public. 70
III. “CIVIL DISTURBANCE” INTERPRETATIONS BY COURTS
REFERS TO VIOLENT OCCURRENCES
Since the NDAA fails to define “civil disturbance,” this area of the
law could develop in a variety of ways. 71 The best solution is for
Congress to amend the law to require federal law enforcement
identification generally, subject to narrow exceptions. 72 Another
option is for the Department of Justice to issue guidance interpreting
“respon[se] to a civil disturbance” broadly, requiring badges anytime
federal officers support local authorities—similar to their guidance
on the policing issues in Ferguson. 73 A broader interpretation would
prevent the abuses which happened to Pettibone and ensure the
identification of officers deployed to prevent a civil disturbance. 74 If
neither Congress nor the Department of Justice clarify the law’s
language, courts will be left to determine what a “respon[se] to a civil
disturbance” means. 75 In such a case, the courts may look to other
uses of “civil disturbance” and the legislative history of the NDAA. 76

68.
69.

70.

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

See infra Part III.
See 116 CONG. REC. H3508 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statement of Rep. Houlahan).
Courts often look to the legislative history when determining what the law is. See,
e.g., CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45153, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THEORIES, TOOLS,
AND TRENDS 36–38 (2018); Mitchell v. Cohen, 333 U.S. 411, 417–18 (1948).
See infra Part III; NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a); see also 116 CONG. REC. H3508
(daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statement of Rep. Houlahan) (“[W]e cannot afford
uncertainty. Our military members are clearly identifiable, and so must our law
enforcement officers be as well.”).
See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a)
See infra text accompanying notes 93–101; see also infra Section IV.B.
See infra Part VII.
See infra text accompanying notes 93–101; see also Levinson & Wilson, supra note
2; Altman, supra note 28.
See NDAA, supra note 19, §723(a).
See infra Sections III.A–B.; supra Part II.
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A. U.S. Supreme Court
There are few modern U.S. Supreme Court cases discussing the
term “civil disturbance,” and where it has been used, it has been
closely tied to terms like “civil disorder” or “insurrection.” 77 Where
“civil disturbance” does appear in case law, it is closely connected
with incidents of violence. 78 In Laird v. Tatum, civilians in Detroit
claimed that the Army’s surveillance of lawful civilian protests
following the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. violated
their First Amendment rights. 79 President Johnson had ordered
federal troops to assist local authorities in response to the “civil
disorders”—i.e., the protests—pursuant to the Insurrection Act. 80 The
Undersecretary of the Army, in a letter, referred to “civil
disturbance” as “outbreaks of violence or incidents with a high
potential for violence beyond the capability of state and local police .
. . to control.” 81 In addition, Attorney General Ramsey Clark
indicated one of the three prerequisites for the use of federal troops in
responding to an event of domestic violence under the Insurrection
Act was when “a situation of serious ‘domestic violence’ exists
within the state.” 82
While Clark’s reasoning is somewhat circular, it does suggest that
the use of the Insurrection Act requires present occurrences of serious
violence beyond the ability of local law enforcement to handle and
that anticipated or imminent violence does not qualify. 83 The Detroit
protest, described as an instance of “civil disorder” or a “civil
disturbance,” is strikingly similar to the Black Lives Matter protests
in the summer of 2020. 84 The interpretation of the language in the

77.

78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

83.
84.

See Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 4–6 (1972); see also Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
478, 496–97 (1978) (describing the events in Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974),
as a “civil disturbance”). Scheuer dealt with the Kent State shootings, which the
Scheuer court itself described as a “civil disorder.” Id. at 233.
See Laird, 408 U.S. at 4–5.
Id. at 3–5.
Id.
Id. at 7–8.
Id. at 3 n.2 (“There are three basic prerequisites to the use of Federal troops in a state
in the event of domestic violence: (1) That a situation of serious ‘domestic violence’
exists within the state. While this conclusion should be supported with a statement of
factual details to the extent feasible . . . .”).
See id.
See id. at 3–5; 116 CONG. REC. H3508 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statement of Rep.
Houlahan); Audra D. S. Burch et al., The Death of George Floyd Reignited a
Movement. What Happens Next?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/
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context of the Insurrection Act is noteworthy, since the identification
requirement was originally proposed as an amendment to the
Insurrection Act. 85
B. State Courts
Guidance from the states is similarly sparse, though the cases also
indicate civil disturbances are connected to violence. 86 Many cases
which discuss civil disturbances arise in the context of a citizen suing
a city in tort for damages arising from injury during a protest. 87 These
cases describe such clearly violent behavior as “civil disturbances.” 88
One case from Michigan recently distinguished “civil
disturbances” from public health issues when interpreting the state’s
Emergency Powers of the Governor Act (EPGA) in response to a
state of emergency during the COVID-19 pandemic. 89 The court held
that the EPGA did not authorize the Michigan governor to declare a
state of emergency, and accordingly restrain healthcare providers
from performing nonessential procedures. 90 In a concurring opinion,
Judge Viviano elaborated on the types of “safety concerns” on which
the EPGA authorized the governor to issue orders, including events
“like riots, in which the behavior of the public is what poses the
safety risk.” 91 The concurrence referred to these as “civil
disturbances” and explained that emergency action in response to
epidemics or a public health crisis was not a civil disturbance—and
thus outside the power granted to the state by the EPGA—leading to
a narrow interpretation limited to occurrences of physical violence. 92

85.
86.
87.

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

04/20/us/george-floyd-protests-police-reform.html [https://perma.cc/FN5G-MEUM]
(Sept. 7, 2021).
See Laird, 408 U.S. at 3–5; 116 CONG. REC. H3508 (daily ed. July 20, 2020)
(statement of Rep. Houlahan).
See cases cited infra notes 87–88, see also infra notes 89–92 and accompanying text.
See Biloon’s Elec. Serv., Inc. v. City of Wilmington, 417 A.2d 371, (Del. 1980);
Monarch Ins. Co. of Ohio v. District of Columbia, 353 F. Supp 1249 (D.D.C. 1973);
Jahnke v. Inc. City of Des Moines, 191 N.W.2d 780 (Iowa 1971); Citoli v. City of
Seattle, 114 Wash. App. 1047 (2002); City of Baltimore v. Silver, 283 A.2d 788 (Md.
1971).
See cases cited supra note 87; see also Murley v. Smith, 322 F. Supp. 991, 994 (N.D.
Tex. 1971) (distinguishing a civil disturbance from a peaceful assembly, implying
civil disturbances involve violent occurrences).
Midwest Inst. of Health, PLLC v. Governor of Mich. (In re Certified Questions from
the U.S. Dist. Ct.), 958 N.W.2d 1, 14 n.12 (Mich. 2020).
Id. at 24.
Id. at 42 (Viviano, J., concurring).
Id.
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The case law suggests that a “civil disturbance” has a threshold
requirement of violent, unlawful activity, indicating federal officials
would not likely be bound by the badge requirement if asked to
provide support to states in instances unconnected to violence. 93
However, the language of the NDAA does not solely require badges
when officers are physically present at a civil disturbance but when
responding to one. 94 This language would allow a court to read the
badge requirements of the NDAA more broadly, as it should. 95 As
long as there is a civil disturbance and the duty of the federal officer
is to support the state in response to that disturbance, the badge
requirement should trigger even if the officer is not physically
present at a scene of violence. For example, the National Guard’s
presence in D.C. for the 2021 inauguration was in response to the
violence of January 6th, even though that violence occurred weeks
ago; the Guard’s presence was to prevent future disorder. 96 The
officers who abducted Pettibone, although not physically present at
the protest, were present in Portland in response to aiding local
enforcement in keeping the peace. 97 The statutory language suggests
a broad reading if the presence of the law enforcement is connected,
even remotely, to a violent incident. 98 A broad reading serves the
public interest, leading to the accountability Congress sought when
passing the law in the first place. 99
If there is no connection to violence, then a judicial interpretation
based solely on the precedential history of “civil disturbance” would
be unlikely to aid a citizen who suffers injustice from an unidentified
officer. 100 A citizen should not need to rely on the presence of nearby
violence to be afforded the right to know the identity of the agent of
the state with whom that citizen interacts. Congress should take
further action to clarify the reach of the law to ensure accountability
of federal law enforcement to the people and to give guidance to the
judiciary. 101
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

See supra cases cited and text accompanying notes 87–89.
NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
See id.
See Altman, supra note 28.
See Levinson & Wilson, supra note 2.
See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 3–5 (1972).
See 116 CONG. REC. H3508 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statement of Rep. Houlahan);
see also supra Part II.
100. See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a); Laird, 408 U.S. at 4–5.
101. See infra Section VI.B. (human rights and accountability); Part VII (DOJ and
accountability).
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IV. FEDERAL GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY TO COMMAND
LAW ENFORCEMENT AND LAW ENFORCEMENT
SAFETY
The executive branch has broad statutory authority to enforce the
law. 102 In response to the 2020 protests for racial justice, Attorney
General Barr stated “all” major law enforcement arms of the
Department were activated to ensure “safety and justice,” including
the U.S. Marshals Service, the Bureau of Prisons (BOP), the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and
Explosives (ATF), as well as the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS). 103 These agencies may designate local law enforcement to act
under federal authority, and without a law requiring otherwise, local
officers deputized under these statutes would not need to identify
themselves unless responding to a civil disturbance. 104 Brief attention
will also be given to how the identification requirement may affect
law enforcement. 105
A. Statutory Authority of the Executive Branch
The U.S. Marshals Service has the power to deputize federal, state,
and local law enforcement, in “any district” designated, “whenever
the law enforcement needs . . . require.” 106 U.S. Marshals have the
power to execute federal arrest warrants 107 and “make arrests without
warrant for any offense against the United States committed in their
presence.” 108 The law grants substantially similar powers to the
DEA, 109 the FBI, 110 and the ATF. 111 The BOP has similar powers for
certain offenses, such as assaulting officers, escape, and riot when the
offense occurs in a penal facility. 112
The Department of Homeland Security—the agency implicated in
the seizure of Mark Pettibone—has the authority to protect federal
property, including areas outside the property to the “extent

102.
103.
104.
105
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

See statutes and regulations cited infra notes 106–14, 116.
Barr & Wray, supra note 10.
See infra Section IV.A.; NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
See infra Section IV.B.
28 C.F.R. § 0.112 (2020).
28 C.F.R. § 0.111 (2020).
18 U.S.C. § 3053.
21 U.S.C. § 878.
18 U.S.C. § 3052.
18 U.S.C. § 3051.
18 U.S.C. § 3050.
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necessary” to protect the occupants and the property itself. 113
Otherwise, the department must “enter into agreements with . . . local
governments” to exercise the agency’s powers or deputize local
officers. 114 Recently, an Inspector General report determined that the
DHS failed to properly designate officers by name who were
deployed to Portland (in violation of 40 U.S.C. § 1315), and some of
those officers used force. 115 Like the aforementioned agencies, DHS
agents may make arrests without a warrant and may deputize local
officers when “in the public interest.” 116
This wide latitude to deputize local law enforcement and arrest
citizens illustrates the need for accountability. 117 In tense situations
where law enforcement must act quickly to keep the peace (and
especially where action could result in unlawful harm to or seizure of
a citizen), requiring officers to wear identifying badges is critical.118
This is necessary for accountability not only during “civil
disturbances,” but in any capacity. 119 With such massive grants of
power, a law requiring identification of law enforcement in every
situation is essential. 120
B. Considerations for Law Enforcement
In expanding the law to apply more broadly than simply
responding to “civil disturbances,” Congress should consider the
effect on the men and women who serve our country and the
potential dangers they are exposed to if required to be identified at all
times. 121 For example, a New York City police official warned police
113. 40 U.S.C. § 1315; see also Levinson et. al., supra note 7; Levinson & Wilson, supra
note 2.
114. 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(1), (e).
115. OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., DEPT. OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-21-05, MANAGEMENT ALERT
- FPS DID NOT PROPERLY DESIGNATE DHS EMPLOYEES DEPLOYED TO PROTECT
FEDERAL PROPERTIES UNDER 40 U.S.C. § 1315(B)(1) (2020) (explaining that
designation was improper because authority was improperly delegated); see also
Christopher Dunn, Federal Forces Storm Portland Protests; Prompting Three
N.Y.
L.J.
(Aug.
5,
2020,
10:37
AM),
Lawsuits,
LAW.COM:
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2020/08/05/federal-forces-storm-portlandprotests-prompting-three-lawsuits/ [https://perma.cc/85K2-ACS2].
116. 40 U.S.C. § 1315(b)(2)(C).
117. See supra text accompanying notes 106–16.
118. See Levinson & Wilson, supra note 2.
119. See infra Part VII.
120. See supra Part III.
121. See Ackerman, supra note 52; 116 CONG. REC. H3508-09 (daily ed. July 20, 2020)
(statements of Reps. Houlahan & Mitchell).
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officers to forego wearing uniforms when back-to-back “hits” had
been ordered on two police officers by a career criminal. 122 The
challenges law enforcement face can also take emotional tolls,
particularly during the summer of 2020, as local officers needed to
balance duty, personal beliefs, and conflicting messages coming from
President Trump, local chiefs and mayors, the criticism of protestors,
and the scrutiny of the media. 123
The cooperation between Reps. Houlahan and Mitchell was
impressive not only for its bipartisan nature, but also for their
attention to balancing the needs of the public and law enforcement. 124
Houlahan (an Air Force veteran) and Mitchell (whose son is a police
officer) are great examples of lawmakers’ ability to balance both
interests. 125 “[W]e wanted to both protect civilians[,] and we also
wanted to protect those people who are in uniform, whether they are
law enforcement from our communities or whether they are National
Guard,” Houlahan stated. 126 The law must be broadened. As agents
of the state, police possess the incredible power to deprive citizens of
life and liberty at their discretion and must bear identification when
they exercise that power. 127 Due to the overwhelmingly great public
interest served by the badge requirement, only law enforcement
needs of the highest order should be accommodated, as in
circumstances when the physical safety of law enforcement and the
need for anonymity are of utmost importance. 128 To serve the public
interest effectively, such exceptions should be lawful in only the
gravest and rarest of circumstances and should be proven necessary
by clear and convincing evidence by law enforcement before being
accommodated in the law by Congress.
122. Shawn Cohen & Megan Sheets, Top NYPD Cop Warns Officers Not to Wear Their
Uniforms in Public for Their Own Safety Following Assassination Attempts on Police
as Suspect is Pictured Handcuffed to Hospital Bed, DAILY MAIL, https://www.
dailymail.co.uk/news/breaking_news/article7985655/NYPD-head-warns-officers-notwear-uniforms-department-logos-public.html [https://perma.cc/R4VD-NPYY] (Feb.
21, 2020, 12:06 PM).
123. Manny Fernandez, For Police Officers, Demonstrations Take a Toll and Test Duty,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/02/us/police-officers-minneapolisprotest.html [https://perma.cc/P295-M58L] (June 6, 2020).
124. See Ackerman, supra note 52; 116 CONG. REC. H3508–09 (daily ed. July 20, 2020)
(statements of Reps. Houlahan & Mitchell).
125. See Ackerman, supra note 52; 116 CONG. REC. H3508–09 (daily ed. July 20, 2020)
(statements of Reps. Houlahan & Mitchell).
126. Ackerman, supra note 52.
127. See 116 CONG. REC. H3508–09 (daily ed. July 20, 2020) (statements of Reps.
Houlahan & Mitchell).
128. See NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a); Cohen & Sheets, supra note 122; Fernandez,
supra note 123.
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V. REQUIRING LAW ENFORCEMENT TO WEAR
IDENTIFICATION IS CONSISTENT WITH THE
CONSTITUTION
Passing a law requiring federal law enforcement agents to wear
badges in any situation where they are policing the public is an
important step the Legislature can take to protect Constitutional
rights. 129 The current legislation helps assure the safety and welfare
of those protesting so they can exercise their rights during situations
of public unrest without the threat of anonymous police. 130 However,
this protection is hollow if the state determines there is not a civil
disturbance. 131 A broader law guarantees protection of these
constitutional rights.
A. Fourth Amendment Not Implicated by Presence of Unidentified
Law Enforcement
The issue presented by law enforcement that refuse to identify
themselves during police interactions with the public is a novel one
under the Fourth Amendment. 132 Unreasonable seizure violates the
Fourth Amendment, so any analysis must center on how an
unreasonable seizure can occur. 133 However, the mere presence of
unidentified police is unlikely to constitute a “show of authority” that
would implicate the Fourth Amendment. 134
A seizure can occur by a show of authority which requires
submission to an officer. 135 In California v. Hodari D., a show of
authority seizure did not occur when police chased an escaping
suspect even though the fleeing suspect knew he was not at liberty to
129.
130.
131.
132.

See infra Sections V.A–C.
See infra Section V.B.
See supra Part III.
Rachel Brown & Coleman Saunders, Can Law Enforcement Officers Refuse to
(June
12,
2020,
12:46
PM),
Identify Themselves?, LAWFARE
https://www.lawfareblog.com/can-law-enforcement-officers-refuse-identifythemselves [https://perma.cc/H8YK-RWT5].
133. Id.; Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16 (1986) (“[W]henever a police officer accosts an
individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he has ‘seized’ that person.”); U.S.
CONST. amend. IV.
134. See I.N.S. v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 218 (1984) (holding the work force of a factory
was not seized by the presence of federal agents at the exit); see infra notes 135–37
and accompanying text.
135. California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626–27 (1991). See also Jeffrey P.
Rosenberger, Seizing the Moment: Is a New Test Needed to Determine Submission in
Show-of-Authority Seizure Cases?, 47 N. KY. L. REV. 31, 32 (2020) (arguing a broad
test for submission is consistent with the outer contours of the Hodari D. rule).
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leave. 136 A show of authority will only result in a seizure if the
person physically submitted to law enforcement, such as being
tackled after an escape attempt. 137 In most lawful, nonviolent
protests, passive surveillance by unidentified police is unlikely to be
an unreasonable seizure violating the Fourth amendment as most
people are free to come and go as they please—though seeing
unmarked police may raise other concerns. 138 So while seeing an
armed, unidentified individual in military garb may inspire fear,
unless an individual physically submits to their authority, it is
unlikely to trigger the Fourth Amendment. 139
B. Chilled Speech and the First Amendment
The First Amendment guarantees the right of the “people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.” 140 The complete range of ways the First Amendment
might be implicated by the presence of unidentified federal agents is
beyond the scope of this Comment. 141 However, a brief examination
of how the presence of unidentified federal officers at a lawful
assembly may “chill” the speech of protesters is warranted. 142
Free speech is strongest and most vigorously protected when
criticism is leveled against the government. 143 In one of the seminal
free speech cases of the 20th century, New York Times v. Sullivan,
the Supreme Court held that the Times did not libel a police
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 629.
Id. at 626–27, 629.
See id.; Delgado, 466 U.S. at 218; infra Section V.B.
See Hodari D., 499 U.S. at 626–27.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
The First Amendment has been said to occupy a “preferred position” in American
constitutional jurisprudence due to the basic democratic precepts it stands for. Baker
v. F & F Inv., 470 F.2d 778, 783 (2d Cir. 1972). The criticism of state law
enforcement by the public in the wake of George Floyd’s death (as has happened
previously in our nation’s history when the public demanded racial equality, such as
the protests in Ferguson, infra Part VII, and the protests in the wake of Martin Luther
King Jr.’s assassination, supra Section III.A.) is a right rooted in the First
Amendment. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964). Due to the
First Amendment’s preferred position and its influence on American constitutional
law, the various ways unidentified state agents could implicate the First Amendment
is vast. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(describing the preferred freedoms rationale); Douglas R. Vadnais, Constitutional
Law—Fourth Amendment—Expanding Permissible Intrusion into First Amendment
Freedoms Under the Aegis of the Fourth Amendment, 12 CREIGHTON L. REV. 881, 895
n.93, 895–96, (1978) (describing the preferred position doctrine).
142. See infra notes 143–50 and accompanying text.
143. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 292.
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commissioner when it published criticism of police conduct. 144 To
hold otherwise—that private entities could be civilly liable for
criticism of the government—would create a “pall of fear and
timidity imposed upon those who would give voice to public
criticism” that is contrary to the First Amendment. 145 The Court has
gone to great lengths to allow “breathing room” for the First
Amendment to prevent a “chilling effect” on free speech. 146 This
“breathing room” allows wide latitude for criticism of public
institutions, such as the police, by the public. 147 How can the public
criticize the federal agency that the unidentified officer serves, much
less take the agency to court, if the agents of the government go
unidentified? 148
It is easy to imagine why good-faith critics of governmental
conduct may seek to assemble. But, upon seeing the presence of
armed, unidentified police, good-faith critics may decline to exercise
the right to assemble out of fear of police action without a way to
hold the police accountable, even if the police never act unlawfully.
This presence could easily chill someone like Mark Pettibone from
exercising his Constitutional rights. 149 The bulwark of First
Amendment jurisprudence seeks to prevent chilling of this sort. 150
C. Due Process Demands Notice of Litigation, Presuming
Identification of Adversary
The Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution insist
that life and liberty not be deprived without “due process of law.”151
Fundamentally, due process requires an opportunity to be heard. 152 A

144. Id. at 283.
145. Id. at 278.
146. Id. at 298, 300 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,
433 (1963)).
147. Id. at 292 (majority opinion) (“[T]ransmuting criticism of government, however
impersonal it may seem on its face, into personal criticism, and hence potential libel,
of the officials of whom the government is composed” “strikes at the very center of
the constitutionally protected area of free expression.”); Button, 371 U.S. at 433
(“First Amendment freedoms need breathing space to survive[.]”).
148. See N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 292.
149. See Levinson & Wilson, supra note 2.
150. See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co., 376 U.S. at 292; Button, 371 U.S. at 433.
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1.
152. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267 (1970) (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S.
385, 394 (1914)).
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hearing requires notice, 153 and its touchstone is one of
reasonableness. 154
There are practical reasons that support identification for purposes
of notice; namely, if the police unlawfully seize a person but the
person does not know who has done so, how can the person take the
government to court? How can the person be sure the government
has acted instead of a vigilante? 155 Notice under due process
presumes identification of the parties is possible. Failing to require
identification unless government agents are responding to a civil
disturbance intentionally shields those agents from accountability for
potential unlawful actions, exempting them from the judicial process
and inhibiting justice. 156
VI. OTHER JURISDICTIONS FAVOR GENERAL
IDENTIFICATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
Other jurisdictions favor law enforcement identification in general
circumstances beyond responses to civil disturbances. More than half
of U.S. states either require law enforcement officers to wear
identifying insignias or recognize the authority a state’s insignia
holds and take steps to prevent abuse, such as banning look-alikes.157
While many states can—and should—go further and require
identification at all times in the same way this Comment advocates
with respect to the federal government, the states’ steps are
significant and indicate the importance of identifying law
enforcement. 158 In addition, international organizations require
identification for transparency and accountability, citing human
rights. 159
A. The States Favor Identification of Law Enforcement
A significant number of states and D.C. recognize the importance
of identification when law enforcement agents are on duty in noncovert operations. 160 This legislation recognizes that unidentified
state actors, or private actors that are misidentified, threaten the
153. Id. at 267–68.
154. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (“An elementary
and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding . . . is notice
reasonably calculated . . . .”).
155. See Wehle, supra note 15.
156. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314; NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
157. See infra Section VI.A.
158. See infra Section VI.A.
159. See infra Section VI.B.
160. See infra Section VI.A.1– 2.
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public. 161 States that have not codified badge requirements have local
ordinances or local policies requiring clear identification. 162 These
requirements indicate that states recognize the association of badges
with the unique state power to arrest or detain and proactively take
steps to avoid abuse by those who wrongfully identify as law
enforcement officers. 163 The federal government should follow suit
by strengthening the current legislation.
1.

States Requiring Identification for Officers

Four states have statutes requiring law enforcement officers to
either wear identifying insignias or identify themselves when
requested. Massachusetts requires uniformed police officers to wear
badges identifying them by name or unique number. 164 The state also
requires that every police officer carry an identification card bearing
the officer’s photograph and other identifying information, and
requires the officer to produce it “upon lawful request for purposes of
California, 166
New
Hampshire, 167
and
identification.” 165
168
Connecticut have similar legislation.
D.C. and Virginia have strong requirements, though less broad. In
2021, D.C. enacted emergency legislation requiring law enforcement
to modify uniforms to ensure officers’ names and badge numbers
appear visibly during First Amendment assemblies, even if the
officers are wearing riot gear. 169 Virginia’s statute requires Virginia
officers who arrest a citizen without a warrant to display “a badge of
office.” 170 Both Virginia and D.C. recognize that when an officer is
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

170.

See infra Section VI.A.3.
See infra Section VI.A.4.
See infra Section VI.A.2–3.
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 41, § 98C (West 2021).
Id. § 98D.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.10 (West 2021) (amended 1989); see also PENAL § 830.1
(defining “peace officer” to include many different types of law enforcement agents,
including police officers).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105:3-a (West 2021).
An Act Concerning Police Accountability, Pub. Act 20-1, § 14(a), 2020 Conn. Legis.
Serv., 1, 12 (West 2020).
D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-331.09 (West 2021); see also Comprehensive Policing and
Justice Reform Congressional Review Emergency Act of 2021, D.C. Laws Act 24128, sec. 112, § 5-331.09, 68 D.C. Reg. 7656, 7666 (enacting an amendment requiring
law enforcement uniforms to “prominently identify” the officers’ status as local law
enforcement during First Amendment assemblies).
VA. CODE ANN. § 52-20 (West 2021) (allowing state police to apprehend suspects
without a warrant provided officers are in uniform or displaying a “badge of office”);
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making an arrest during a sensitive situation where citizens are
protesting or may be arrested without a warrant, the citizen should
have notice that the person arresting them acts with the state’s
authority. 171
2.

States Requiring Identification of Certain Branches of Law
Enforcement

Many states, though lacking general legislation requiring all
officers to wear badges, require certain branches of law enforcement
to be distinctively identified to the public. For example, South
Carolina requires their immigration enforcement division to
“conspicuously display” their badges. 172 Indiana and Oregon require
police officers to wear badges when enforcing traffic laws.173
Mississippi, Washington, and Ohio require railroad police officers to
wear badges while on duty. 174 Rhode Island, Maryland, and Nebraska
require badges for specially designated officers as well. 175
While not explicitly requiring a badge to be worn, Louisiana
requires state police uniforms to be “distinctive in color, design,
material, markings, and insignia so as to be readily and easily
identifiable from a reasonable distance as the uniform worn by the
[state’s] police . . . .” 176 The statute forbids other state agencies and
private individuals from wearing similar uniforms that could
“confuse” or “not be clearly distinguishable” from police
uniforms. 177 Though it is not required for Louisiana officers to wear

171.
172.
173.
174.

175.

176.
177.

see also id. § 46.2-102 (requiring state police and law enforcement officers to either
be uniformed or display a badge or other signal of authority during enforcement).
See id. § 52-20; D.C. CODE ANN. § 5-331.09.
S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-6-60(C)(2)(d) (West 2021) (requiring officers of the
immigration enforcement unit to wear badges “conspicuously displayed”).
IND. CODE ANN. § 9-30-2-2(a)(1)–(2) (West 2021) (preventing arrests for violations of
traffic offenses unless the officer is either wearing a badge and uniform or driving a
vehicle clearly marked as police); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 810.400 (West 2021).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 77-9-505(3) (West 2021) (requiring railroad officers to wear
badges in plain view while on duty); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 81.60.050 (West
2021) (requiring railroad police to wear badges “in plain view” and to provide official
credentials on request); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4973.20 (West 2021) (requiring
officers to wear a badge identifying the officer as police when on duty and “in plain
view”).
12 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 12-2.2-3 (West 2021) (requiring capitol police to visibly
wear badges); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 3-310 (West 2021) (requiring that
special police wear “a distinctive police badge” worn in plain view, unless on
detective duty); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1717 (West 2021) (requiring sheriffs and
deputies wear a badge while on duty).
LA. STAT. ANN. § 40:1376(B) (West 2020).
Id. § 40:1376(C).
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badges during active duty, the state clearly recognizes the power the
uniform and insignia communicates to the public and that agents in
uniform are endowed with authority to potentially deprive someone
of liberty. 178 By prohibiting copycats and even other state agencies
from using uniforms that, even unintentionally, could mislead the
public into thinking they must comply with the directions of the
bearer, the state recognizes the power of identification and the
dangers of mis-identification. 179 Notably, none of the aforementioned
states require badges only when the police perform certain kinds of
tasks, such as policing a disturbance.
3.

States That Prohibit Non-State Actors from Wearing Insignias
Similar to State Badges

Like Louisiana, at least nine other states do not require law
enforcement agents to wear badges in the line of duty but do
criminalize imposters or forbid the use of badges that look
substantially similar to official badges. Many have regulations
preventing private security guards from wearing badges that look like
police badges. 180 Other states criminalize impersonation of an
officer. 181
Such statutes are constitutional. 182 The Fourth Circuit held in
United States v. Chappell that a Virginia statute criminalizing the use
of badges to impersonate officers did not violate the First
178. See id. § 40:1376(F).
179. See id.
180. See HAW. CODE R. § 16-97-14 (LexisNexis 2021) (preventing private detectives from
wearing badges similar in design to government law enforcement agencies); IOWA
ADMIN. CODE r. 661-121.12(80A) (West 2021) (limiting badges for private security to
only those approved, and excluding from approval any with similarities to state
agencies); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 338.1069 (West 2021) (private security badges
shall not deceive the public by looking like federal or state law enforcement agency
insignias); MONT. ADMIN. R. 24.182.407(1) (West 2021) (private security badges
must not display a word like “police” or wear patches indicating association with the
state); TENN. CODE ANN. § 62-35-127 (West 2021) (prohibiting badges or insignias
worn by security guards that are similar to state law enforcement agencies).
181. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-37-208 (West 2021) (criminalizing impersonation of an
officer when displaying a badge by which an officer is lawfully distinguished); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.430 (West 2021) (criminalizing impersonation of an officer
when unlawfully assuming the badge of an officer); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-2-14
(West 2021) (those who impersonate an officer by use of a badge commit a petty
misdemeanor); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 37.12 (West 2021) (criminalizing false
identification of an officer when possessing a badge bearing the insignia of a law
enforcement officer).
182. See, e.g., United States v. Chappell, 691 F.3d 388, 399–400 (4th Cir. 2012).
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Amendment. 183 The defendant, who was formerly employed as a
police officer, used his driver’s license photo depicting him in a
police uniform to get out of a traffic ticket. 184 The defendant was
convicted under the anti-impersonation statute. 185 The court found
the statute was consistent with the First Amendment, acknowledging
that the police carry the “oppressive potential . . . [to] curtail[] . . .
liberty” and their identity should not be appropriated by unauthorized
individuals to exercise that power over others. 186 Police
impersonation statutes further a “compelling” interest of promoting
public safety, and overturning them would allow “an untold flock of
faux policemen.” 187 While the Chappell court did not discuss
whether the defendant was pictured wearing a badge in the photo, the
court’s holding indicates that the use of uniforms carries great
influence in the public’s ability to identify who possesses the power
of the state, and states have a lawful interest in preventing
imposters. 188
4.

States Requiring Identification by Body Cam Legislation or
Local Ordinances

Some states recognize badges as an important part of a uniform.
Illinois, for example, passed body camera legislation requiring the
cameras be turned on “at all times” when police officers are in
uniform. 189 “Uniform” is defined as wearing, among other things, a
badge which includes the officer’s identification number. 190
Beyond state-wide legislation, countless local ordinances and
department policies require badge-wearing or other identification
methods. 191 For example, New York City passed the Right to Know
Act in 2017 which requires police officers to furnish business cards
with identifying information whenever they stop or search an

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

See id.
Id. at 391.
Id.
Id. at 399–400 (alteration in original).
Id. at 399.
See id. at 399–400.
50 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 706/10-20(a)(3) (West 2021).
Id. § 706/10-10.
See, e.g., Brown & Saunders, supra note 132; Brian Palmer, Do Police Officers Have
to Identify Themselves?, SLATE (July 22, 2009, 5:07 PM), https://slate.com/news-andpolitics/2009/07/a-henry-louis-gates-jrexplainer-roundup.html
[https://perma.cc/5MMT-A5A7].
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individual suspected of a crime who is ultimately not arrested. 192 In
Cheyenne, Wyoming, reserve officers are required to wear badges by
local ordinance. 193 Local police departments, such as ones in
Minnesota 194 and Alaska, 195 have policies requiring officers to wear
badges as well.
At least twenty-nine states and D.C. recognize the role proper
identification of law enforcement plays in public life, whether by
requiring officers to wear or carry identification, seeking to prevent
misappropriation of identity by imposters, in bodycam legislation, or
in local ordinances and policies. 196 These actions by the states
demonstrate that badges are associated with state power and serve to
place the public on notice that an agent of the state is present,
whether it be for a citizen’s protection or the exercise of state power
to arrest or detain. 197 Identification keeps officers accountable if they
commit an act of abuse. 198 States have taken broad action recognizing
the power and potential for abuse of state insignias, and Congress
should follow suit by removing the “civil disturbance” limitation. 199
B. International Organizations
In addition to the home front, the federal government can look to
international organizations. 200 The United Nations has issued
guidance for law enforcement to comply with human rights
practices. 201 In addition, the United Nations General Assembly
192. Ashley Southall, Right to Know Is Now the Law. Here’s What That Means., N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/nyregion/right-to-knowact-nypd.html [https://perma.cc/G2GB-CNJ8].
193. CHEYENNE, WYO., CODE § 2.28.090 (2001) (requiring badges to be used to identify
reserve officers).
194. MINNEAPOLIS POLICE DEP’T, POL’Y & PROC. MANUAL § 3‑116 (2021),
https://www.minneapolismn.gov/media/-www-content-assets/documents/MPDPolicy-and-Procedure-Manual.pdf [https://perma.cc/4T56-6H9F].
195. ALASKA DEP’T OF PUB. SAFETY, OPERATING PROC. MANUAL § 124.320 (2021),
https://dps.alaska.gov/AST/PIO/CompleteOPM_Redacted.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BY27-ERFU]. The manual details the different types of uniforms,
with most listing a badge as part of the required uniform. Id. §§ 102.360(A)(1),
102.360(D)(1), 102.370(B), 102.380(F)(5), 102.390(A)(1)–(2), 102.390 (B)(3).
196. See supra text accompanying notes 160–95.
197. See supra Sections VI.A.1–3.
198. See discussion infra Section VI.B.
199. See supra Sections VI.A.1–3.
200. See sources cited infra notes 205–17 and accompanying text.
201. OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., HUMAN RIGHTS AND LAW
ENFORCEMENT, A TRAINER’S GUIDE ON HUMAN RIGHTS FOR THE POLICE 78 (2002),
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/training5Add2en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SD67-
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passed resolutions indicating law enforcement officers should be
identifiable. 202 A primary goal in requiring identification is to ensure
accountability of law enforcement to their superiors. 203 The position
of the United Nations provides another compelling reason for the
United States to expand legislation requiring federal agents to wear
identification in situations beyond civil disturbances. 204
The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human
Rights published a training guide on human rights and the police. 205
One of the stated objectives is “[t]o provide information on
international human rights standards relevant to the work of
police.” 206 In a chapter on transparency, the manual describes
practices that are consistent with the international standards of
treatment of arrested citizens by detention officers. 207 The model
practices require all officers to “[w]ear clearly visible identity badges
at all times,” so any violations may be reported to a supervising
officer. 208 While these standards are given in the context of prison
officials, the theory that law enforcement remains accountable to the
individuals the state has detained is consistent with requiring general
identification. 209
In 1990, delegates of the United Nations convened in Havana as
the Eighth Congress on the Prevention of Crime to agree to basic
principles on when and how law enforcement officials should use
force. 210 The congress passed a resolution and presented it to the
General Assembly, which adopted it. 211 The principles require

202.

203.

204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

E5PY] [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE] (“Wear a clearly visible identity badge at
all times.”).
OFF. OF THE U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., BASIC PRINCIPLES ON THE USE OF
FORCE AND FIREARMS BY LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS 2 (Sept. 7, 1990),
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/firearms.pdf [hereinafter LAW
ENFORCEMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES].
Id. ¶ 24 (“[L]aw enforcement agencies shall ensure that superior officers are held
responsible if they know . . . that law enforcement officials under their command are
resorting . . . to the unlawful use of force and firearms . . . .”); HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE,
supra note 201, at 79 (“Require all detention officers to wear clearly visible identity
badges to facilitate accurate reporting of violations.”).
See infra notes 205–17 and accompanying text.
See HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE, supra note 201.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 77–78.
Id. at 78–79.
See id.
See LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, ¶ 1.
G.A. Res. 45/121, Eighth United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and
the Treatment of Offenders, ¶ 3 (Dec. 14, 1990) (“Welcomes the instruments and
resolutions adopted by the Eighth Congress, and invites Governments to be guided by
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violations of use of force measures to be reported to superior officers
and demand the government hold superior officers responsible for the
actions of those they supervise. 212 The accountability requirement
raises a key practical question: how can law enforcement agents be
held accountable to their superiors if the citizenry cannot identify
those officers? 213
The guidance presumes identification is possible for reporting; but,
if occurrences such as the one that happened to Pettibone are
repeated outside a response to a civil disturbance, citizens will be
unable to identify law enforcement agents who act unlawfully. 214
Unidentified officers cannot be held accountable to their superiors or
through the judicial process. 215 Requiring identification of federal
officers also reaffirms the central tenets of democracy that the United
States has always stood for on the international stage. 216 The United
States has been part of the General Assembly since its inception and
would disrespect the body and their senior status by ignoring central
human rights principles. 217
VII. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE SUPPORTS GENERAL
IDENITIFICATION OF LAW ENFORCEMENT
After a police officer shot Michael Brown, an 18-year-old black
man, in Ferguson, Missouri, the Department of Justice (DOJ)
conducted a civil rights investigation of the Ferguson Police

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

217.

them in the formulation of appropriate legislation and policy directives and to make
efforts to implement the principles contained in them . . . .”) (emphasis omitted).
See LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, ¶ 24.
See id.
See id.; Levinson & Wilson, supra note 2; NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
See LAW ENFORCEMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 199, ¶ 24.
Compare id., ¶10 (ensuring officers are held responsible for the unlawful use of
firearms), with Vitaly Shevchenko, “Little Green Men” or “Russian Invaders”?,
BBC (Mar. 11, 2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-26532154
[https://perma.cc/5UWP-5LK6] (describing accountability challenges stemming from
unidentified law enforcement during the Ukrainian crisis of 2014).
See Celine Van den Rul, Why Have Resolutions of the UN General Assembly if They
Are Not Legally Binding?, E-INT’L RELS. (July 16, 2016), https://www.eir.info/2016/06/16/why-have-resolutions-of-the-un-general-assembly-if-they-are-notlegally-binding/ [https://perma.cc/5CGQ-YMXE]; UNITED NATIONS, GROWTH IN
UNITED NATIONS MEMBERSHIP, https://www.un.org/en/about-us/growth-in-unmembership [https://perma.cc/683Z-SP92] (last visited Mar. 6, 2021); LAW
ENFORCEMENT BASIC PRINCIPLES, supra note 202, ¶ 24; HUMAN RIGHTS GUIDE, supra
note 201, at 16.
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Department. 218 The DOJ published a scathing report criticizing the
police department’s practices and sent a letter giving reasons why
local police should wear nameplates. 219 A critical part of the letter
states:
Officers wearing name plates while in uniform is a basic
component of transparency and accountability. It is a nearuniversal requirement of sound policing practices and
required under some state laws. Allowing officers to remain
anonymous when they interact with the public contributes to
mistrust and undermines accountability. The failure to wear
name plates conveys a message to community members
that, through anonymity, officers may seek to act with
impunity. Further, the lack of name plates makes it difficult
or impossible for members of the public to identify officers
if they engage in misconduct, or for police departments to
hold them accountable. 220
The letter also encourages the department to enforce the provisions
of the uniform policy, which requires nameplates. 221 In addition to
this letter and the report, the United States and the City of Ferguson
signed a consent decree where the city agreed to “require all
[Ferguson Police Department] officers to wear nameplates or
nametags as part of the standard uniform” so the public can identify
the officers when they interact. 222
218. See Matt Apuzzo, Ferguson Police Routinely Violate Rights of Blacks, Justice Dept.
Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/justicedepartment-finds-pattern-of-police-bias-and-excessive-force-in-ferguson.html
[https://perma.cc/F873-K7SF].
219. See Press Release, Dep’t of Just., Just. Dep’t Announces Findings of Two C.R.
Investigations in Ferguson, Missouri (Mar. 4, 2015), https://www.justice.
gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-findings-two-civil-rights-investigationsferguson-missouri [https://perma.cc/EQM7-3KUD]; U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., C.R. DIV.,
INVESTIGATION OF FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015) https://www.justice.
gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_
department_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4USP-9C66]; Letter from Christy E. Lopez,
Deputy Chief, U.S. Dep’t of Just., to Thomas Jackson, Police Chief, City of Ferguson
(Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy/2014/11/04/
ferguson_ltr_nameplates_9-23-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT28-MNT7].
220. Letter from Christy E. Lopez to Thomas Jackson, supra note 219.
221. Id.; see also Ferguson, Mo., Ordinance 214.02(C)(13) (Jan. 13, 2012),
http://www.fergusoncity.com/DocumentCenter/View/2230/Ferguson-PoliceDepartment-General-Orders-?bidId= [https://perma.cc/L4YH-QU8A].
222. Consent Decree at 90, United States v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-000180-CDP
(E.D. Mo. Mar. 17, 2016) (“The City will require all FPD officers to wear nameplates
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Why should the reasons given for requiring local police to wear a
nameplate not apply with equal force to federal officers? Why should
the requirements only apply in response to civil disturbances?223
Transparency, the dangers of anonymity and undermining public
trust, and disciplining misconduct are all important when policing the
public in any capacity, whether federal or local. 224 The City of
Ferguson formally agreed, on the DOJ’s insistence, to require
officers to wear identification to increase accountability and foster
public trust. 225 These same steps should be taken by federal law
enforcement agents when they are called upon to perform a police
function. The DOJ should require federal officers to do what it
demanded of local law enforcement. 226
VII. CONCLUSION
There is ample support for why legislation requiring federal law
enforcement to wear identification should be extended to cover any
instance of federal officers policing the public. State laws and
international human rights guidance indicate the need for
accountability and care in ensuring state agents, such as police
officers, are properly identified to the public. 227 The Department of
Justice investigation and response to the Ferguson Police Department
corroborates this stance while emphasizing the need to build public
trust and transparency. 228 In addition, expanding the law would be an
essential step the Legislature can take to protect constitutional
rights. 229 If Congress does not take action, courts can construe the
statute’s “respond” language broadly to require federal troops to wear
identification whenever they are deployed in connection with
“violent occurrences.” 230 If Congress wants to take control over the
law and not leave it for the courts to interpret, potentially leaving

223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.

or nametags as part of the standard uniform that will allow members of the public to
identify officers with whom they interact.”).
See Letter from Christy E. Lopez to Thomas Jackson, supra note 219; NDAA, supra
note 19, § 723(a).
See Letter from Christy E. Lopez to Thomas Jackson, supra note 219.
See Consent Decree, supra note 222, at 90.
See Letter from Christy E. Lopez to Thomas Jackson, supra note 219; see, e.g.,
Apuzzo, supra note 218; Burch et al., supra note 84.
See supra Part VI.
See supra Part VII.
See supra Part V.
See supra Part III.
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citizens vulnerable, it must take immediate action to expand the reach
of the law beyond civil disturbances. 231
This law was certainly needed in the wake of the Black Lives
Matter protests calling for police accountability. 232 Requiring federal
agents who are called in to assist with civil disturbances to wear
identification was a victory for the American people and certainly
will protect Americans asserting their rights during tense
assemblies. 233 However, Congress must go further by requiring
federal law enforcement to identify themselves when they publicly
perform policing tasks, including exercising the power to arrest and
detain, to prevent abuses of state power outside civil disturbances. 234
Extending the law is an essential step the Legislature has already
embarked upon and is necessary to keep the government accountable
to the American people. 235

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

See supra Part III.; NDAA, supra note 19, § 723(a).
See Wehle & Gehret, supra note 32.
See id.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part VII.

